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Abstract
Focuses on the protections afforded by the fourth and fifth amendments to aliens prosecuted
in the United States for crimes they have committed abroad.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF NONRESIDENT ALIENS
PROSECUTED IN THE UNITED STATES
INTRODUCTION
Assume, in an effort to curb the rising tide of drug traffic into
the United States,' American agents entered a foreign country, ob-
tained incriminating evidence and statements in a manner which
violated the fourth 2 and fifth 3 amendments from foreign nationals
involved in the drug traffic, kidnapped them and then brought
them to the United States for prosecution. At their trial, the for-
eign defendants argued that they were entitled to constitutional
rights and therefore the incriminating evidence and statements
must be supressed. Whether an alien who is tried in the United
States for a crime he'committed abroad is entitled to constitutional
rights is a question of first impression. Few cases have considered
this question and those that have speak in dictum. 4
In the past, American citizens traveling abroad were not pro-
tected by the Constitution's benevolent shield. 5 Moreover, aliens
1. On January 11, 1980, Peter B. Bensinger, head of the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration stated, "All of Europe is overflowing with Middle East
heroin, and our intelligence strongly indicates what we can expect large amounts to
hit the United States in the new year." A bumper crop of 1,500 tons of raw
opium-100 times the amount harvested in Mexico-was produced in Iran, Pakistan
and Afghanistan for the year 1979. Gage, Mideast Heroin Flooding Europe, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 11, 1980, at Al, col. 3.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In part, the fourth amendment guarantees "against
unreasonable searches and seizures ......
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person ...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be'a witness against himself .. "
4. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); United States v.
Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F.
Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976).
5. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891). Ross was an American citizen serving as a
seaman on an American vessel in Japanese waters. He was tried and convicted be-
fore an American consular court in Japan for killing another American aboard ship.
Ross argued that he-was denied his constitutional right to an indictment by a grand
jury for the crime of murder. The Court sustained Ross' conviction stating that the
constitutional protections applied "only to citizens and others within the United
States, or [those] who are brought there for trial for alleged offenses committed else-
where, and not to residents or temporary sojourners abroad." Id. at 464.
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residing in the United States were not accorded constitutional pro-
tections by the courts.6 It is now settled that the Constitution pro-
tects American citizens and aliens residing in the United States, 7 as
well as American citizens residing abroad if the United States gov-
ernment is involved.8 It is unclear, however, whether the Consti-
tution protects an alien who commits a crime abroad and then is
brought to the United States for prosecution. 9
An American court will not concern itself with the manner in
which a defendant is brought within its jurisdiction'0 unless there
is "torture, brutality or similar outrageous conduct."" Beyond the
threshold question of jurisdiction, courts must determine whether,
once at trial, an alien who has committed a crime abroad is entitled
to the same constitutional protections as an American citizen under
similar circumstances.
The focus of this Note will be on the protections afforded by
the fourth and fifth amendments to aliens prosecuted in the United
States for crimes they have committed abroad. The prerequisites
for obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident aliens are analyzed in
Part I of this Note. Part II discusses the constitutional rights of
American citizens abroad in order to establish the potential scope
of the rights of aliens abroad. Finally, Part III examines the consti-
tutional rights of aliens who are prosecuted in the United States for
crimes they have committed abroad. It is submitted that an alien
who has committed a crime abroad and then is prosecuted for that
crime in the United States has established, by virtue of his pres-
ence in an American court and his justified expectation of constitu-
tional rights, sufficient contact with the United States and its system
of laws to entitle him to the protection of the Constitution. 12
6. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). In its opinion, a unani-
mous Supreme Court held that a Chinese resident alien could not return to his home
in the United States after a visit abroad because Congress nullified his return certifi-
cate in his absence. See United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905); Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
7. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33
(1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Note, Protection of Alien Rights
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1971 Duke L.J. 583.
8. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Reid held that two American civilian de-
pendents of American servicemen stationed abroad who were convicted by United
States military courts for murder were entitled by the Constitution to a trial in a ci-
vilian court. Id. at 6.
9. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
10. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
11. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001
(1975).
12. See Part III infra.
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I. JURISDICTION
Before the United States can prosecute an alien for a crime he
has committed abroad, it must establish jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter 13 and the person.' 4 In most cases, the United States
cannot infringe upon the primary jurisdiction of other nations over
persons whom the United States claims to be acting in violation of its
criminal laws. 15 The United States may properly attempt prosecu-
tion, however, where Americans are injured by aliens engaged in
criminal activity which occurs outside the United States but which
other nations cannot or will not prosecute.16 In these instances, the
United States must first establish that it has jurisdiction to prose-
cute such aliens.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
When the United States prosecutes an alien for a crime he
committed abroad, it bases jurisdiction on the objective territorial-
ity principle. 17 Under this principle, the United States has jurisdic-
13. See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911); United States v. Pizzarusso,
388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968).
14. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436
(1886).
15. Smallwood v. Clifford, 286 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1968).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
17. See Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29
AM. J. INT'L L. 435 (Spec. Supp. (1935) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Research
Draft]. The objective territoriality principle is sometimes referred to as the "effects
doctrine." Most nations recognize, in varying degrees, five principles on which juris-
diction with respect to a crime may be based.
These five general principles are: first, the territorial principle, determining
jurisdiction by reference to the place where the offense is committed; sec-
ond, the nationality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the
nationality or national character of the person committing the offense; third,
the protective principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the na-
tional interest injured by the offense; fourth, the universality principle,
determining jurisdiction by reference to the custody of the person com-
mitting the offense; and fifth, the passive personality principle, determin-
ing jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national character of the
person injured by the offense.
Id. at 445. Traditionally, the United States has relied on the territoriality and nation-
ality principles to establish jurisdiction. Id. at 543-44. See, e.g.., American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). Our courts, however, have adopted the
objective territoriality principle which is very similar to the protective principle.
United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 10. When an alien commits a crime abroad,
the United States can not base jurisdiction on the territoriality principle or national-
ity principle because the crime was neither committed in the United States nor was
it committed by an American citizen. In general, the universality principle does not
apply because this principle concerns those who are enemies of all mankind. The
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tion to prosecute a nonresident alien when he engages in criminal
activity that produces detrimental effects within the United
States 8 because such effects constitute an element of the offense. 19
Using the hypothetical posed in the Introduction as an illustration,
the United States has subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign
defendants because their drug operations have a detrimental effect
in the United States, i.e., the distribution of illegal drugs to Ameri-
can users.
B. Personal Jurisdiction
In 1886, the Supreme Court held in Ker v. Illinois20 that the
power of a court to prosecute a person for a crime is not impaired
because he was brought within the court's jurisdiction by means of
a forcible abduction. 21 Sixty-six years later the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the rule announced in Ker when it decided Frisbie v. Col-
lins.22 These cases are the mainstay of the doctrine that a court will
not divest itself of personal jurisdiction over the defendant because
of the method by which he was brought to trial. 23
passive personality principle will not be applied because the United States does not
recognize its validity. Only the objective territoriality principle may be applied to es-
tablish jurisdiction when an alien commits a crime abroad which results in a detri-
mental effect in the United States.
18. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. at 280 (1911). Mr. Justice Holmes aptly de-
fined this principle as follows: "Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to pro-
duce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the
cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect ...." Id. at 285. See Judge
Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945). The objective territoriality principle is a spin-off of the protective
principle. Under the protective principle, a country:
has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct outside its territory that threatens its security as a state or the opera-
tion of its governmental functions, provided that conduct is generally recog-
nized as a crime under the laws of states that have reasonably developed le-
gal systems.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 33 (1965). See also Harvard
Research Draft, supra note 17. The protective principle and the objective territorial-
ity principle do have one difference. Under the former, all that need be shown is a
"'potentially adverse effect" on the security of a country whereas under the latter, an
actual adverse effect is required. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 10-11; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 33, Comment at 93 (1965).
19. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 936 (1968). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §
- "18 (1965).
20. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
21. Id.
22. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
23. See, e.g., Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d at 65.
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In 1974, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals questioned the
validity of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in United States v. Toscanino .24
The defendant in Toscanino, an Italian citizen, alleged that Ameri-
can agents employed illegal electronic surveillance against him,
kidnapped him from his home in Uruguay, interrogated and tor-
tured him for three weeks in Brazil and finally brought him to the
United States for trial.2 5 The court held that if the defendant's alle-
gations were true, an American court would lack personal jurisdic-
tion over him.2
6
Judge Mansfield, writing for the court, rejected the age-old
Ker-Frisbie doctrine reasoning that the Supreme Court had ex-
panded the scope of due process after the Ker-Frisbie doctrine was
established.2 7 The court recognized that due process now reaches
illegal acts committed by overzealous police officials prior to trial.2 8
24. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
25. Toscanino alleged that a Uruguayan policeman, acting as the paid agent of
the United States, called his home and lured him to a nearby bowling alley where
several policemen knocked him unconscious, blindfolded him and drove him to Brazil.
While on the way to Brazil, they stopped and he was ordered to lie on the ground
and remain silent while troops passed or he would be killed. When in Brazil he was
denied food and water and "incessantly tortured." He was forced to walk up and
down a hall for hours until he could no longer walk, at which point the Brazilians
beat and kicked him. His fingers were pinched with pliers. Alcohol and other liquids
were flushed in his eyes, nose and anal passage. Electrodes were attached to his
earlobes, toes and genitals and he was then shot through with electricity until uncon-
scious. Toscanino alleged that this was done with the knowledge of United States
agents who finally brought him to the United States for trial. 500 F.2d at 268-70.
26. Id. at 281.
27. 500 F.2d at 272. See generally United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961).
28. 500 F.2d at 272. Courts will exclude evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth or fifth amendments. The exclusionary rule was established in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Weeks held that evidence obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment by federal agents could not be used in federal court. Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) excluded evidence illegally obtained by state officers from
state court. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful police
conduct and to promote judicial integrity. The primary justification for the rule has
become deterrence. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)
("The rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional
right of the party aggrieved.") Chief Justice Burger expressed dissatisfaction with the
exclusionary rule arguing that the rule is incapable of attaining its deterrent effect
and that "the release of countless guilty criminals" is far too great a price for society
to pay. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). See Bennett, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An
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In addition, Rochin v. California29 marked a significant extension
of due process when it held that evidence obtained through police
brutality should be excluded from trial because it "shocked the
conscience" of a civilized society.30 Judge Mansfield maintained
that in light of the expanded scope of due process, the United
States was barred from prosecuting a defendant where personal ju-
risdiction was obtained by flagrantly illegal law enforcement prac-
tices. 31
The Second Circuit retreated from the* position it took in
Toscanino when it decided Lujan v. Gengler.3 2 The defendant in
Lujan, an Argentine citizen, was abducted by Bolivian police acting
as the paid agents of the United States and was forcibly brought by
them to the United States for prosecution. 33 Lujan differed from
Toscanino in that the defendant in Lujan did not allege "any acts of
torture, terror or custodial interrogation of any kind." 34 Chief
Judge Kaufman, writing for the Court of Appeals, held that, absent
Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1129 (1973); Doppert, Standards for the Suppression of Evidence Under the Su-
preme Court's Supervisory Power, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 364 (1977).
29. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
30. Id. at 169. In Rochin, the defendant swallowed two morphine capsules im-
mediately after police entered his California dwelling. The police took the defendant
to a hospital where a doctor induced defendant to vomit by the use of an emetic so-
lution. This was all done against the defendant's will. Id. at 165.
31. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 267, 274 (2d Cir. 1974).
32. 510 F.2d 62 (1975).
33. Id. at 63. Chief Judge Kaufman described the following "grade-B film sce-
nario:"
Lujan, a licensed pilot, was hired in Argentina by one Duran to fly him to
Bolivia. Although Duran represented that he had business to transact there
with American interests in Bolivian mines, he in fact had been hired by
American agents to lure Lujan to Bolivia. When Lujan landed in Bolivia on
October 26, 1973, he was promptly taken into custody by Bolivian police
who were not acting at the direction of their own superiors or government,
but as paid agents of the United States. Lujan was not permitted to com-
municate with the Argentine embassy, an attorney, or any member of his
family.
On the following day the Bolivian police, commanded by Police Major
Guido Lopez, took Lujan from Santa Cruz to La Paz, where he was held un-
til November 1, 1973. On that date a Lieutenant Terrazas and other Bolivian
police, acting together with American agents, brought Lujan to the airport
and placed him on a plane bound for New York. Upon his arrival at
Kennedy Airport, Lujan was formally arrested by federal agents. At no time
had he been formally charged by the Bolivian police, nor had a request for
extradition been made by the United States.
Id.
34. Id. at 66.
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"torture, brutality and similar physical abuse," a court will not di-
vest itself of personal jurisdiction over a defendant because of the
manner in which he was brought to trial. 35 While recognizing that
Toscanino established that government agents could not bring de-
fendants from abroad by means of torture or brutality, Judge
Kaufman emphasized that conduct by American agents which does
not amount to physical abuse of the defendant will not divest the
court of jurisdiction. 36
The other circuits that have considered this issue are in accord
with Lujan in limiting Toscanino to cases involving torture, bru-
tality and similar outrageous conduct. 37 Ker and Frisbie remain the
basis of the doctrine that, barring extraordinary circumstances, 38
"the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by
the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by
reason of a 'forcible abduction.' "39 Applying this doctrine to the
initial hypothetical, the American court need not divest itself of
personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendants who were kid-
napped by the American agents because forcible abduction alone
does not constitute torture, brutality or similar physical abuse.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF AMERICANS
COMMITTING CRIMES ABROAD
It is axiomatic that aliens abroad cannot have greater constitu-
tional rights than American citizens abroad.40 Therefore, a determi-
nation of the rights of Americans abroad (vis-a-vis the fourth and
fifth amendments) will establish the potential scope of the rights of
aliens abroad.
35. Id. at 69.
36. Id. at 65. Judge Kaufman stated:
in recognizing that Ker and Frisbie no longer provided a carte blanche to
government agents bringing defendants from abroad to the United States by
use of torture, brutality and similar outrageous conduct, we did not intend to
suggest that any irregularity in the circumstances of a defendant's arrival in
the jurisdiction would vitiate the proceedings of the criminal court.
Id. (emphasis in original).
37. United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847
(1975); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975); United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 965
(1975).
38. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d at 68.
39. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. at 522. See Gernstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975).
40. See generally Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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In 1957, in the landmark case of Reid v. Covert,41 the Su-
preme Court held that the Constitution applied to Americans
residing in foreign countries. 42 Mr. Justice Davis, writing for the
Court, stated: "When the Government reaches out to punish a citi-
zen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other
parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty
should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in an-
other land." 43
With respect to the extraterritorial application of the fourth
and fifth amendments, courts have not applied the exclusionary
rule in certain circumstances. 44 The Supreme Court stated that the
exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right, but a "judi-
cially created remedy designed to safeguard fourth amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect ...... "45 Where Amer-
ican agents alone illegally obtain evidence from American citizens
abroad, courts exclude such evidence because it deters similar con-
duct by American agents in the future. 46 Where foreign officials,
acting independently, obtain evidence from American citizens
abroad in a manner which violates the fourth or fifth amend-
ments, courts will not exclude such evidence, absent extreme cir-
cumstances,4 7 because its exclusion will not deter similar conduct
by foreign officials in the future .48
41. 354 U.S. 1 (1957) See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
42. Id. at 6.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 906 (1967); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 963 (1965).
45. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). See, e.g., Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966). See also
Doppert, supra note 28; Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929 (1965); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 671 (1970).
A defendant is allowed to prevent the reception of evidence proving his
guilt not primarily to vindicate his right of privacy, since the benefit re-
ceived is wholly disproportionate to the wrong suffered, but so that citizens
generally, in the words of the amendment, may be "secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures "
Friendly, supra at 951.
46. See notes 50-54 infra and accompanying text.
47. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d at 62, 69 (1975). See notes 32-36 supra and ac-
companying text.
48. See, e.g., Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 906 (1976); Kaplan, The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule in Federal
Court to Evidence Seized and Confessions Obtained in Foreign Countries, 16
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 495 (1977).
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The difficulty in applying the exclusionary rule arises when
American agents act in conjunction with foreign officials .49 The cir-
cuit courts have developed various tests to determine the extent to
which American officials must participate, if at all, before the ex-
clusionary rule is applied to evidence obtained through illegal for-
eign searches and seizures. 50 In 1968, the Ninth Circuit adopted
the "joint venture" test under which American agents must "sub-
stantially participate" in the illegal search of American citizens
abroad for the exclusionary rule to be invoked. 51 The Ninth Circuit
also established the "participation" test which requires somewhat
less involvement by American agents in the foreign search. 52 Ille-
gally obtained evidence will not be suppressed under the Tenth Cir-
cuit's "purpose" test unless American agents seized such evidence
with the intention of using it in an American trial of an American
citizen.5 3 The "Jordan doctrine," developed by the United States
49. Kaplan, supra note 48, at 502.
50. The following tests have developed to determine the degree of American
participation necessary to invoke the exclusionary rule: The "joint venture" test, the
"participation" test, the "purpose" test and the "Jordan doctrine." Kaplan, supra
note 48, at 502-10.
51. Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 960 (1969), established the joint venture test. In Stonehill, Philippine authori-
ties conducted a search of an American citizen in the Philippines. American agents
helped in the investigation and in the planning of the raid but did not take part in
the search. Stonehill held that American agents must "substantially participate" in
the illegal search of an American citizen abroad for the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule to be applied. Simple cooperation is insufficient. Id. at 743. The joint ven-
ture test is a vague standard which permits American agents considerable latitude
when conducting searches abroad; such latitude runs counter to the Supreme Court's
trend of extending the Constitution to protect Americans traveling abroad.
52. Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 966
(1967); and Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
963 (1965), established the participation test. American agents must actively take part
in illegal searches of American citizens abroad before the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule applies. In Brulay, United States customs agents gave Mexican police
information indicating that the defendant was associated with drug traffic. The court
held that this conduct did not constitute participation. 383 F.2d at 348. The participa-
tion test is vague. Although less is required than under the joint venture test, how
much less is uncertain. Kaplan, supra note 48, at 505.
53. United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949
(1975), adopted the purpose test. In Mundt, an American narcotics agent, acting in
conjunction with Peruvian police, played a substantial part in the planning of the
search, monitoring of defendant's room, and field testing the evidence which was
seized. Despite the American agent's substantial role, the court held that the exclu-
sionary rule did not apply because his purpose in gathering the evidence was not to
use it in an American trial of the American defendant. 508 F.2d at 906-07. The pur-
pose test is flawed because it ignores the primary justification for the exclusionary
rule, i.e., deterrence.
19801
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Court of Military Appeals, requires only minimal participation by
American agents in the foreign search for the exclusionary rule to
be applied. 54 Unfortunately, as the Fifth Circuit has noted, the
tests are inconsistent in their approach to the problem. 55
Applying the foregoing analysis of the rights of Americans
abroad to the rights of aliens abroad, illegally obtained evidence
will be suppressed only where American officials or their agents
are involved. As long as deterrence remains the primary justifica-
tion for the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained exclusively by for-
eign officials in a manner which violated the fourth or fifth
amendments will not be suppressed whether such evidence was
obtained from an American citizen or an alien abroad.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS
COMMITTING CRIMES ABROAD
The constitutional rights of aliens have developed slowly. 56
While aliens residing in the United States are protected by the
fourth and fifth amendments in common with American citizens,57
it is unclear whether this protection extends to nonresident aliens
to be prosecuted in the United States for crimes they committed
54. United States v. Jordan, 23 C.M.A. 525, 50 C.M.R. 665 (1975), on rehearing,
[1976] 19 Crim. L. Rep. 2025, represents the most expansive application of the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule to illegal searches of American citizens abroad. Jordan,
on first hearing before the United States Court of Military Appeals, held that evi-
dence seized abroad from American citizens by foreign officials should be excluded
from court even though American agents were not involved whatsoever. 23 C.M.A. at
527, 50 C.M.R. at 667. On rehearing, the court retreated from its earlier position and
held that evidence seized solely by foreign officials in accordance with the laws of
the foreign nation should not be excluded from court. If, however, an American
agent participates in any manner in the foreign search, the illegal evidence will be
excluded. 19 Crim. L. Rep. at 2025. This author maintains that Jordan set forth the
most desirable test. Jordan is consistent with the underlying justification for the ex-
clusionary rule as well as the Supreme Court's trend in extending the Constitution to
protect Americans residing in foreign countries.
55. United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976). Courts "that have
considered the question of how much American participation . . . is required to man-
date application of the exclusionary rule have not been consistent in their choice of
the precise test to be applied." Id. at 140.
56. Gordon, The Alien and the Constitution, 9 CALIF. W.L. REV. 1, 1 (1972).
57. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33
(1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Yi Au Lau v. United States Immi-
gration and Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864
(1971); Note, Protection of Alien Rights Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1971
Duke L.J. 583.
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abroad. 58 Thus, the question arises whether an American court
should exclude evidence obtained by American agents from aliens
abroad because the manner in which it was obtained violated the
fourth and fifth amendments.
A. Alien's Presence in the United States
An alien tried in the United States for a crime he committed
abroad arguably has established sufficient identity59 with the
United States by virtue of his trial and possible imprisonment in
this country to entitle him to the constitutional protections afforded
resident aliens. 60
In the landmark case of Johnson v. Eisentrager,61 twenty-one
German soldiers were tried and convicted by a United States mili-
tary commission sitting in China for violating the laws of war 62 by
continuing military activity in China after Germany had surren-
dered on May 8, 1945.63 The German soldiers petitioned for writs
of habeas corpus64 claiming that their imprisonment violated Arti-
cles 165 and 11166 of the Constitution and the fifth amendment. 67
The Supreme Court held that the petitioners, as nonresident en-
emy aliens, were not entitled to the rights of personal security and
immunity from military trial guaranteed by the Constitution.68 The
Court, distinguishing between nonresident enemy and nonresident
58. See, e.g., Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 1168, 1172
n.
4 (D.D.C. 1977).
59. In Johnson v. Eisentrager, the term "identity" was used to characterize the
contacts an alien must have with the United States to entitle him to constitutional
rights, i.e, "his identity with our society." 339 U.S. at 770.
60. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
61. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
62. See M. GREENSPAN, SOLDIER'S GUIDE TO THE LAWS OF WAR 79 (1969).
The United States recognizes the validity of the laws of war. See, e.g., Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded in Armies in the Field, done at
Geneva, 22 August 1864, 22 Stat. 940, T.S. No. 337 (effective 26 July 1882).
63. 339 U.S. at 766. The German soldiers gave intelligence information to the
Japanese concerning the movement of the American armed forces. Id.
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). A writ of habeas corpus allows a person im-
prisoned in an American prison to contest the constitutionality of his trial or confine-
ment. Id.
65. Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution delineates the powers delegated to Con-
gress under the Constitution.
66. Article III of the U.S. Constitution delineates the powers of the Judiciary of
the federal government.
67. 339 U.S. at 765.
68. Id. at 785.
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friendly aliens, 69 relied on the petitioners' status as nonresident en-
emy aliens as the basis for denying them the constitutional rights
of personal security and immunity from military trial. 70
In dictum, the Johnson Court stated that a nonresident
friendly alien is entitled to an ascending scale of rights as he in-
creases his identity with the United States. "Mere lawful presence
in [this] country . . . gives him certain rights .... .71 The Court
emphasized that it is necessary to establish the alien's presence in
the United States in order to trigger the protective mechanism of
the Constitution: "[In extending constitutional protections beyond
the citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it was
the alien's presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the
Judiciary power to act. "72 Johnson noted several factors that dem-
onstrated presence: (1) location of the trial, (2) place of residence,
(3) locale of captivity, (4) site of the offense, and (5) place of con-
finement. 73 The Court indicated that, assuming that petitioners
were nonresident friendly aliens, they remained, nonetheless,
strangers to the United States because they met none of the re-
quirements of presence. 74
It is submitted that a nonresident friendly alien who is being
tried in the United States for a crime committed abroad has estab-
lished sufficient identity with the United States, by virtue of his
presence at trial and possible imprisonment in this country, 75 to
entitle him to the same degree of constitutional protection afforded
the resident alien.
69. But even by the most magnanimous view, our law does not abolish in-
herent distinctions recognized throughout the civilized world between ...
aliens of friendly and of enemy allegiance, nor between resident enemy
aliens who have submitted themselves to our laws and non-resident enemy
aliens who at all times have remained with, and adhered to, enemy govern-
ments.
Id. at 769
70. Id. at 773. The Court observed that "[i]t is war that exposes the relative
vulnerability of the alien's status." Id. at 771. For example, nonresident enemy al-
iens do not have access to our courts. See id. at 776. It is important to note that a
nonresident alien defendant in a criminal prosecution is not considered an enemy al-
ien. A person is an enemy alien if the nation of his allegiance is at war with the
United States. Id. at 773.
71. 339 U.S. at 770 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 771.
73. Id. at 781.
74. Id.
75. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
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B. Justified Expectation of Constitutional Rights
An alien who is tried in the United States for a crime he
committed abroad arguably has a justified expectation that he is en-
titled to the full scope of advantages afforded by the legal system
with which he is forced to deal. Berlin Democratic Club v. Rums-
feld,76 in dictum, supports this contention.
In Berlin, American citizens and one Austrian citizen, all
residing in West Germany, brought a civil action in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia against United
States Army officials, alleging that the army had engaged in a
series of operations which constituted violations of their fourth and
fifth amendment rights. 77 As to the claims of the American citi-
zens, the court held that the army had violated their fourth and
fifth amendment rights. 7s As to the claims of the Austrian citizen,
however, the court held that he lacked standing to sue. 79
The Austrian citizen unsuccessfully argued that United States v.
Toscanino8° signaled a trend toward permitting nonresident aliens
to sue United States officials for alleged violations of their con-
stitutional rights. 81 In rejecting this argument, Chief Judge Jones,
writing for the court, distinguished the cases noting that Toscanino
dealt with a nonresident alien who had been seized abroad in order
to prosecute him in a domestic court8 2 while Berlin concerned a non-
resident alien plaintiff in a civil action whose presence in an Ameri-
can court was voluntary.8 3 Judge Jones reasoned that there are differ-
ent expectations of treatment when a nonresident alien is forced to
appear and defend himself in a domestic criminal proceeding than
when a nonresident is merely subjected to improper conduct by
American agents abroad.8 4 The nonresident alien prosecuted in the
76. 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976).
77. The plaintiffs alleged that United States Army officials conducted illegal
electronic surveillance, infiltrated organizations, opened mail and other harassment.
Id. at 147-48.
78. Id. See Part II supra.
79. Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. at 153.
80. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). See notes 24-31 supra and accompanying text.
81. Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. at 152.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 153.
84. "[Wlhen a non-resident alien is brought from abroad to appear and be the
subject of a domestic criminal prosecution, there are different expectations of treat-
ment than when a non-resident is simply affected by United States officials abroad."
Id. at 152.
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United States justifiably expects that he is entitled to the full scope
of advantages of the legal system with which he is forced to deal. 8 5
By contrast, the nonresident alien who brings a civil action is not
forced into an American court and should not expect that he is en-
titled to all of the advantages afforded by the legal system within
which he has chosen to bring suit.86 Consequently, Berlin held
that the Austrian citizen lacked standing to sue United States offi-
cials for improper conduct abroad because he was not entitled to
constitutional rights as a plaintiff in a civil action.87
At least where the government attempts to use the fruits of its
illegal conduct in a criminal proceeding against the nonresident al-
ien in the United States, there is no sound reason to protect an al-
ien residing in the United States from unconstitutional action and
not to protect aliens residing abroad from similar unlawful con-
duct.88 Laws which "make unjust ... discriminations between per-
sons in similar circumstances" are prohibited by the Constitution. 89
Since both aliens residing in the United States and nonresident
aliens forcibly brought to the United States are within our territo-
rial jurisdiction and subject to our laws, it is submitted that it is
fair and just to grant each the same constitutional protections. 90
C. Policy Considerations
Arguably, the denial of constitutional rights to aliens prose-
cuted in the United States for crimes committed abroad conflicts
with American foreign policy with respect to human rights. 91 Con-
85. Id.
86. Id. at 153.
87. Id.
88. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974). The court
noted that the "Constitution ... applies only to the conduct abroad of agents acting
on behalf of the United States. It does not govern the independent conduct of for-
eign officials in their own country." Id. at 280 n.9. See, e.g., Part II supra.
89. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). In Yick Wo, a law passed by
the city of San Francisco prohibited anyone from operating a laundry business with-
out first obtaining a permit from the city. All American citizens were granted permits
whereas all Chinese aliens were denied them. The Supreme Court held that aliens
were protected by the fourteenth amendment in common with American citizens.
The Court reasoned that the fourteenth amendment applied "to all persons within
the territorial jurisdiction [of the United States], without regard to any differences of
race, of color, or of nationality ...." Id. at 369.
90. Although Berlin held that nonresident alien plaintiffs are not entitled to
constitutional rights, that case is distinguishable for the reasons previously set forth.
See notes 82-87 supra and accompanying text.
91. The human rights movement is based on the principle that all persons pos-
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stitutional rights are fundamentally the substantive and procedural
application of basic human rights in our system of laws. 92 The
fourth and fifth amendments were adopted because of "the strongly
felt attitude of our society that important human values are
sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of
securing a conviction," illegally seizes evidence or obtains a co-
erced confession. 93 The United States has championed the cause of
human rights for many years. 94 President Carter has spoken vigor-
ously against human rights violations in other countries95 and Con-
gress has enacted legislation denying military assistance and eco-
nomic aid to governments engaged in a consistent pattern of gross
human rights violations. 96 Denying constitutional rights to nonresi-
dent aliens prosecuted in the United States conflicts with this ex-
press foreign policy.
D. The Uranium Club Cases
In the Uranium Club cases, 97 Westinghouse, an American cor-
poration, was sued in federal court for breach of contracts to supply
uranium. 98 In defense, Westinghouse contended that an interna-
tional cartel of uranium producers created artificially high prices of
uranium and thereby made performance of the contracts commer-
cially impractical. 99 At the request of Westinghouse, the federal
sess basic human rights which no country may violate. "Unlike other international
law, the law of human rights serves idealistic ends, not particular national inter-
ests ... " L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 229 (2d ed. 1979).
92. "[T]he fundamental rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, con-
sidered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law
which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to
men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws . Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. at 370.
93. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960).
94. L. HENKIN, supra note 91, at 236-37.
95. See id. at 237.
96. Congress has passed laws which make trade concessions to the U.S.S.R. de-
pend on respecting human rights in that country. The United States obtained com-
mitments for human rights from the Soviet Union in exchange for political accept-
ance of the status quo in Eastern Europe when the Conference on National Security
and Cooperation in Europe was held in Helsinki in 1975. See L. HENKIN, supra note
91, at 237.
97. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. [1978] 1 All E.R. 434;
Re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation MDL Docket No. 235,
[1977] 3 All E.R. 703.
98. [1978] All E.R. 434, 436-37.
99. Id. at 434.
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court issued letters rogatory to the High Court in England re-
questing that the High Court summon certain non-party British
witnesses who were allegedly involved in the cartel.100 The
witnesses, when examined in London, claimed that they were enti-
tled to the protection of the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution on the ground that the testimony they would give
might subject them to civil and criminal proceedings in the United
States for violations of the United States antitrust laws. 1' 1 The
Court of Appeals in England referred this issue to Judge Merhige,
the judge presiding over the federal action in the United States, 10 2
who ruled that the British witnesses were entitled to the fifth
amendment privilege.' 0 3 Judge Merhige's ruling is significant be-
cause the British witnesses were nonresident aliens who might be
subjected to civil and criminal proceedings in the United States
and supports the contention that nonresident aliens prosecuted in
the United States are entitled to constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
As few cases have considered the question whether an alien
who is tried in the United States for a crime he committed abroad
is entitled to constitutional rights, this Note contends that an
American court should exclude evidence obtained by American
agents from aliens abroad because the manner in which it was ob-
tained violated the fourth or fifth amendments. Arguably, an alien
prosecuted in the United States for a crime he committed abroad is
entitled to constitutional rights because of his presence in the
United States while on trial and in prison and his justified expecta-
tion that he is entitled to the advantages of the legal system with
which he is forced to deal. Because of the constitutional require-
ment that laws be applied equally, evidence obtained illegally by
American agents should be suppressed at trial, whether the de-
fendant is an American citizen or a nonresident alien.
Bruce Bryan
100. Id. at 435.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 436.
103. Id.
